Abstract-Thispaper describes techniques that enable vehicles to collect local information (such as road conditions and traffic information) and report it via road-to-vehicle communications. To exclude malicious data, the collected information is signed by each vehicle. In this communication system, the location privacy of vehicles must be maintained. However, simultaneously linkable information (such as travel routes) is also important. That is, no such linkable information can be collected when full anonymity is guaranteed using cryptographic tools such as group signatures. Similarly, continuous linkability (via pseudonyms, for example) may also cause problem from the viewpoint of privacy. In this paper, we propose a road-to-vehicle communication system with relaxed anonymity via group signatures with time-token dependent linking (GS-TDL). Briefly, a vehicle is unlinkable unless it generates multiple signatures in the same time period. We provide our experimental results (using the RELIC library on a cheap and constrained computational power device, Raspberry Pi) and simulate our system by using a traffic simulator (PTV), a radio wave propagation analysis tool (RapLab), and a network simulator (QualNet). Though a similar functionality of time-token-dependent linking was proposed by Wu et al. ("Balanced trustworthiness, safety, and privacy in vehicle-to-vehicle communications," IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 59, 2010), we can show an attack against the scheme where anyone can forge a valid group signature without using a secret key. In contrast, our GS-TDL scheme is provably secure. In addition to the time-dependent linking property, our GS-TDL scheme supports verifier-local revocation, where a signer (vehicle) is not involved in the revocation procedure. It is particularly worth noting that no secret key or certificate of a signer (vehicle) must be updated, whereas the security credential management system must update certificates frequently for vehicle privacy. Moreover, our technique maintains constant signing and verification costs by using the linkable part of signatures. This might be of independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION

L
OCATION privacy is widely recognized as an important issue, especially in the case of motor vehicles. For example, Rouf et al. [2] mentioned that location privacy could be compromised via a tire pressure monitoring system, and Xu et al. [3] proposed a secure communication protocol as a countermeasure against this vulnerability. However, simultaneously real-time local information is important and useful, e.g., information about traffic and road conditions is indispensable for maintaining urban operations. Therefore, collecting local information without infringing on privacy is an important issue that requires a resolution.
Let us consider a situation in which vehicles collect such local information and report it via road-to-vehicle communications. To exclude malicious data, this collected information must be signed by each vehicle. In this case, it seems undesirable, from the viewpoint of privacy, to link location information (obtained from collected information and signatures) to an individual. As a countermeasure, Whyte et al. provided the security credential management system (SCMS) [4] , in which a pseudonym certificate authority issues certificates to vehicles frequently to prevent linking vehicles. However, because vehicles must update their certificates frequently, it is difficult to manage securely in practice. Applying group signatures [5] could be a solution where a verifier can anonymously verify a signer (vehicle), about which there have been numerous studies, e.g., [6] - [10] . In particular, Wu, Domingo-Ferrer and González-Nicolás [7] proposed an anonymous threshold authentication scheme, in which messages are accepted when more than t vehicles send the same message (signed by the vehicles). The core cryptographic technique in their system utilizes a message-linkable group signature (MLGS), where two group signatures become linkable if a signer generates a group signature for the same message twice. Thus, we can protect the case in which a vehicle sends two signatures of the same massage even in an anonymous environment.
Our Target: In road-to-vehicle systems, collecting linkable information (such as travel routes) is important. However, if cryptographic tools with full anonymity (or more precisely, unlinkability), such as group signatures, are simply employed, no such linkable information can be collected. Conversely, continuous linkability (via pseudonyms, for example) is problematic from the viewpoint of privacy. For example, a vehicle with continuous linkability is tracked from the time the vehicle is 0018-9545 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. acquired up until the time it is sold, and parking spaces, which may include the driver's home and work place, are revealed. Therefore, suitably defining "moderate" anonymity with practical efficiency in a road-to-vehicle communications context is an important issue that must be resolved. One may think that the Wu et al. MLGS scheme [7] could be applicable for constructing a privacy-preserving system, however, we note that no formal security definition for MLGS is provided in [7] and the security proofs are informal. In fact, we can show an attack against the MLGS scheme of Wu et al., where anyone can forge a valid group signature without using a secret key (see Section III). Moreover, we must consider revocation to exclude discarded cars, cars with malicious behaviors, and so on.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose a road-to-vehicle communication system with relaxed anonymity by considering time-dependent linking properties, where a vehicle is unlinkable unless it generates multiple signatures in the same time period T . We assume that a token generation unit (TGU) generates a timedependent token t T at a time T , and broadcasts t T . Each signer (vehicle) with a unique identity ID, generates a signature σ on a message M (local information) by using its own signing key sigk ID and t T . A verifier (we assume a road side unit (RSU) in the road-to-vehicle communications context) checks whether σ is a valid signature. As a remark, no secure channel is required for issuing a token t T e.g., via GPS systems or more simply via RSU in the road-to-vehicle communications context. We give a brief description of our system in Fig. 1 . Time-dependent linking appears to be more suitable for our system than messagedependent linking [7] where a vehicle is always linkable if it generates group signatures on the same message twice, and this situation might occur when a vehicle is used for work trips and uses the same road each day. 1 The core cryptographic tool in our system is group signatures with time-token dependent linking (GS-TDL), which we propose in this paper. In GS-TDL, a signer is unlinkable unless it generates multiple signatures in the same time period T . If T is set as short as possible, then GS-TDL comes close to usual group signatures i.e., a signer is always unlinkable whereas if T is set as long as possible, then GS-TDL comes close to usual digital signatures i.e., a signer is always linkable. That is, GS-TDL can control how long linkable information can be corrected by setting T (in our network simulation (Section V-B), we set T as 600 seconds). Our GS-TDL supports verifier-local revocation (VLR) [11] - [13] , where no signer is involved in the revocation procedure. In particular, our GS-TDL achieves backward unlinkability [11] , [12] , [14] , which prevents adversaries from breaking anonymity, even after vehicles are revoked. It is particularly worth noting that no secret key or certificate of a signer (vehicle) must be updated whereas SCMS [4] must update certificates frequently for vehicle privacy. Moreover, our time-dependent linking properties enable us to achieve constant verification costs, whereas those of previous schemes are O(r), where r is the number of revoked users. This is apparently related to independent interest. We also provide the experimental results of our road-tovehicle communication system, and show that our system is feasible in practice. To implement GS-TDL, we use the RELIC library [15] . 2 We also simulate our system by using a traffic simulator (PTV), 3 a radio wave propagation analysis tool (RapLab), 4 and a network simulator (QualNet).
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Our GS-TDL is secure in the random oracle model under the q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption [17] and the strong decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion (SDDHI) assumption [18] , [19] . The group signature size in our scheme is shorter than that of previous schemes owing to time-dependent linkability. Specifically, a signature contains only 6 group elements, whereas that of the short group signature scheme [20] contains 9 group elements, that of the short controllable linkable group signature scheme [21] contains 8 group elements, and that of the controllable linkable group signature scheme (for dynamic group setting) [22] contains 12 group elements. Recently, though a short dynamic controllable linkable group signature scheme is proposed [23] , a signature contains 8 group elements. 6 In addition to the signature size, our linking algorithm does not require cryptographic computations. The algorithm simply compares whether two elements are the same.
Related Work: Because car security has been recognized as a real threat, several organizations have been launched, e.g., Preserve (EU) [24] , ITS Info-communications Forum (Japan) [25] , and IntelliDrive (USA) [26] , and car security is researched in several papers e.g., [27] - [30] .
Nakanishi et al. proposed a linkable group signature [31] , where anyone can determine whether two signatures were made by the same signer. In contrast to GS-TDL, no time-dependent token is required for linking. That is, two group signatures made by the same signer are always linkable. A group signature with a relaxed anonymity for VANET has been considered in [8] . However the link algorithm is not publicly executable, and an authority called Link Manager is introduced. That is, two group signatures made by the same signer are always linkable from the viewpoint of Link Manager. Moreover, pairing computations are required for linking. Abe et al. [32] proposed double-trapdoor anonymous tags which can generally construct traceable signatures [33] . Because a signer is always linkable after the corresponding token is broadcasted, we cannot use traceable signatures instead of GS-TDL. As a special case of traceable signatures, group signatures with controllable linkability have been proposed [21] , [22] , [34] , where a link key is defined for the linking procedure. However, pairing computations are required for linking, which lead to inefficiency.
Kumar et al. proposed a group signature scheme with probabilistic revocation [35] . In this scheme, a token (which they call an alias token) is contained in a group signature, and the same token is used when group signatures are generated in the same time period, i.e., these are linkable as in our GS-TDL. Though their scheme could be a candidate for constructing an anonymous time-dependent authentication system, there are many problems as follows. First, their security model does not consider revocation. That is, there is a possibility that, for example, anonymity might be broken if some other users are revoked. Moreover, their security model also does not consider timedependent linking.
Liu et al. [36] proposed an anonymous authentication roaming protocol supporting time-bound credentials, where a user secret key is bounded to an expiry time. Though this timebound property might be applicable to time-dependent linking, their protocol has a disadvantage where the size of the common group public key, which is necessary for generating signatures, depends on the bit-length for representing a time period. In the road-to-vehicle communication context, each vehicle is required to have such a long-size pubic key. In the meantime, the size of the group pubic key in our scheme is constant.
Chow, Susilo, and Yuen [37] proposed two linkable ring signature schemes. The first one is an identity-based linkable ring signature scheme where anyone can check whether two signatures are made by the same signer (i.e., providing public verifiability). This functionality could be employed in our usage. However, one drawback is the size of signatures. That is, a signature contains 12 group elements (and an event identity). In contrast, our scheme provides a shorter signature that contains 6 group elements. The second one is a ring signature scheme with escrowed linkability where a linking authority can link two signatures by using a secret key. As in group signatures with controllable linkability [21] , [22] , [34] , pairing computations are required for linking.
Chow [38] proposed an efficient tracing mechanism where the user-specific tracing trapdoor allows us to reconstruct tags. In the Chow traceable signature scheme, the tracing authority computes N tags for each signer. A signer sets a counter between 0 and N , where N is the number of unlinkable signatures, and proves that the counter is in [0, N] via a range proof technique. If the same counter is used for generating two or more signatures, then these signatures are traced because the same tag (specified to a signer and a counter value) is contained in them. This functionality could be employed in our usage. If we assume that each tag is computed for each time period (i.e., a counter value is set as T ), then we could achieve the time-dependent linking property. Note that the range proof can be removed in our usage since the time period is a public value. The signature size then does not depend on N . Thus, our GS-TDL scheme can be regarded as a special case of the Chow scheme. Note that the Chow scheme provides additional functionalities (opening and claiming). Thus, in our proposal, we adequately customize the Chow scheme to fit our usage i.e., removing range proofs, opening, and claiming.
Remark: Because we mainly focus on how to control anonymity in the group signature context, we do not discuss how to preserve location privacy revealed from messages to be signed. For example, anonymity is never guaranteed if a message M to be signed contains the identifier of a vehicle itself. Even if we avoid such an extreme case, some personal information might be infringed from M . Here, we must assume that no personal information is revealed from a content M (or even its statistical values). Though we may apply privacy preserving techniques for modifying contents or its statistical values, (e.g., [39] , [40] ), this is beyond the scope of this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES: CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEFINITIONS
In this section, we give the definitions of bilinear groups, complexity assumptions, and digital signature as follows.
Complexity Assumptions: Let G be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and generates a parameter (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g 1 , g 2 ) of bilinear groups, where p is a λ-bit prime, G 1 , G 2 and G T are groups of order p, e is a bilinear map from G 1 × G 2 to G T , and g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Here,
ab holds. We use the asymmetric setting, i.e., G 1 = G 2 , and assume that no efficient isomorphism between G 1 and G 2 is known.
Definition II.1 (SDDHI Assumption [18] ): We say that the SDDHI (Strong Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion) assumption holds if for all PPT adversaries A,
where O x is an oracle which takes as input z ∈ Z * p \{T }, outputs g
We remark that the underlying bilinear group must not be symmetric.
Definition II.2 (q-SDH Assumption [17] ): We say that the q-SDH (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman) assumption holds if for
Digital Signature: Let (Gen, Sign, Verify) be a digital signature scheme. The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter λ, and outputs a pair of verification/signing key (vk, sigk). The signing algorithm Sign takes as input sigk and a message to be signed M , and outputs a signature Σ. The verification algorithm Verify takes as input vk, Σ and M , and outputs 0/1. We require the following correctness property: for all (vk, sigk) ← Gen(1 λ ) and M , Pr[Verify(vk, Sign(sigk, M), M) = 1] = 1 holds. Next, we define existential unforgeability against chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) as follows. Let C be the challenger, and A be an adversary. C runs (vk, sigk) ← Gen(1 λ ) and gives vk to A. A is allowed to issue signing queries M . C runs Σ ← Sign(sigk, M) and returns Σ to A. Finally, A outputs (Σ * , M * ). We say that a digital signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Verify) is EUF-CMA if the probability, that Verify(vk, Σ * , M * ) = 1 and A did not send M * as a signing query, is negligible.
III. THE WDG CONSTRUCTION AND ITS VULNERABILITY
In IEEE T. Vehicular Technology 2010, Wu, Domingo-Ferrer and González-Nicolás (WDG) [7] proposed message-linkable group signature (MLGS), where if a signer generates a group signature for the same message twice, then two group signatures become linkable. From MLGS, they constructed an anonymous threshold authentication for vehicle-to-vehicle communications, where if more than t vehicles send the same message (signed by vehicles) then this information is accepted. In their system, four entities are defined: a vehicle V, the vehicle manufacturer VM, the registration manager RM, and the group tracing manager T M. In this section, we give an attack against their MLGS scheme denoted by the WDG scheme. Briefly, we show that anyone can forge a valid group signature without knowing a signing key.
The WDG scheme is described as follows: 
as a secret signing key. In a signing phase for a message M , V selects s, r y ← Z p and computes
, and σ 6 = r y − σ 5 y, and outputs a group signature σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ 6 ). That is, this proves that the discrete logarithm of σ 3 and that of σ 4 (i.e., y) are the same. In the verification phase, check e(σ 2 , g 2 )e(σ 1 , h 2 )e(σ 3 , U 2 ) = A and σ 5 
3 ). The problem of this construction is that no RM's verification key is involved in the signing and verification phases. Before showing our attack, we explain a typical methodology for constructing group signature introduced in [41] , [42] as follows: a key issuer (RM in the MLGS context) has a verification/signing key pair (vk, sk) of a signature scheme, and an opener (T M in the MLGS context) has a public/secret key pair of an encryption scheme. The key issuer then generates a signature for a user (V in the MLGS context) as a signing key (say cert). In the signing phase, a user encrypts cert by using the public key of the opener, and computes a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof that proves "encrypted cert is a valid signature under vk".
Since the WDG scheme did not include such a vk, anyone can forge a valid group signature. The concrete attack is described as follows: let A be an adversary. A chooses y, k, s, r y ← Z p and computes
r y ||σ r y 1 ), and σ 6 = r y − σ 5 y, and outputs a group signature σ forge = (σ 1 , . . . , σ 6 ). Then, σ forge is a valid group signature though A does not have a signing key. Moreover, since A does not register Y , no T M can trace the signer of σ. This breaks traceability.
IV. GS-TDL: SYNTAX AND OUR CONSTRUCTION
A. Syntax of GS-TDL
Before providing the syntax, we discuss whether the open functionality should be utilized in our usage. In the open functionality, an authority (called an opener) can determine the identity of the actual signer by using a secret opening key. For example, the open functionality is implemented by using public key encryption (PKE) or non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and could be an efficiency bottleneck. It has been reported that the signature size of the Furukawa-Imai group signature scheme [43] can be reduced by 50% if the open functionality is removed [44] . It also has been reported that implementing the open functionality without using PKE leads to a short group signature scheme at the expense of the signature opening costs [45] - [47] . Owing to the above facts, we do not consider the open functionality because we pursued a lightweight implementation of the system, and we consider only the linking functionality.
We note that MLGS [7] is essentially the same as the unique group signature proposed by Franklin and Zhang [19] , and formal security definitions are given in [19] . That is, we may be able to apply a unique group signature to construct a road-to-vehicle communication system. However, our time-dependent linking seems suitable for the system rather than message-dependent linking as explained before. Moreover, the Franklin-Zhang model supports the open algorithm and considers a stronger anonymity (so called CCA anonymity). Since we customize the syntax to be suitable for light-weight realization and exclude the open algorithm, in this paper we do not directly apply the Franklin-Zhang unique group signature scheme to our system.
Moreover, we assume that the signing key of a signer is embedded in a device during the setup phase, so we remove an interactive join algorithm from our syntax. Finally, we consider the revocation functionality, especially verifier-local revocation (VLR) where no signer is involved in revocation procedures. That is, we introduce revocation lists RL that contain revocation tokens of revoked signers. The signing algorithm does not take RL as an input, whereas the verification algorithm takes RL as the input. For time-token dependent linking, we introduce the token key generation algorithm and the token generation algorithm, and the signing algorithm takes a time-dependent token as the input. Note that the revocation check can be implicitly used for tracing signers by generating revocation tokens for all signers and checking the revocation equation. This methodology is essentially the same as that of the open algorithm of Bichsel et al. [45] and its follow up works [46] , [47] .
Definition IV.1 (Syntax of GS-TDL):
A group signature scheme with time-token dependent linking GS -T DL consists of the algorithms (Setup, GKeyGen, TKeyGen, Join, TokenGen, GSign, Revoke, GVerify, Link) as follows: 1) Setup: The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, and outputs a public parameter params. 2) GKeyGen: The group key generation algorithm takes as input params, and outputs a group public key gpk, a group master key gsk, an initial revocation storage grs := ∅ and an initial revocation list RL 0 := ∅. 3) TKeyGen: The token key generation algorithm takes as input params, and outputs a public key tpk and a secret key tsk. 4) Join: The join algorithm takes as input gsk, grs and a unique identity ID, and outputs a signing key sigk ID and updated revocation storage. We remark that this algorithm is not required to be interactive. 5) TokenGen: The token generation algorithm takes as inputs tsk and a time T , and outputs a token t T . 6) GSign: The signing algorithm takes as inputs gpk, tpk, t T , sigk ID , and a message M to be signed, and outputs a group signature σ. 7) Revoke: The revocation algorithm takes as inputs gpk, grs, and a set of revoked users at a time T {ID T ,1 , . . . , ID T ,n T }, and outputs RL T . Here, n T is the number of revoked users on T . 8) GVerify: The verification algorithm takes as inputs gpk, tpk, RL T , σ, and M , and outputs 0 (invalid) or 1 (valid). 9) Link: The linking algorithm takes as inputs gpk, tpk, and RL T , and two signatures and messages
, and outputs 1 if two signatures are made by the same signer, and 0 otherwise. We remark that the Link algorithm outputs 0 does not guarantee two signatures are made by the different signers. For example, if a signature is invalid, then the algorithm outputs 0.
B. Security Definitions of GS-TDL
In this section, we give security definitions of GS-TDL by adding the time-dependent linkability to the BellareMicciancio-Warinschi (BMW) model [41] (which is recognized as a de-facto standard for group signature). 7 We require the following correctness, where any honestly generated signatures are valid, and the Link algorithm correctly links two signatures if these are generated by the same signing key with the same token, unless the corresponding signer is not revoked. Moreover, we require that a signature is invalid if the corresponding signer is revoked. 8 
Definition IV.2 (Correctness):
For any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A and the security parameter λ ∈ N, we define the experiment Exp corr GS -TDL,A (λ) as follows. 7 Recently, Bootle et al. [48] consider fully dynamic group signatures where users can join and leave at any time. They point out that previous definitions are weak in the sense that these definitions allow members who joined at recent time periods to sign messages w.r.t earlier time periods during which they were not members of the group. Though this situation may be a problem in some applications (e.g., sign a document), however, in our usage, it seems easy to ignore such signatures by a verifier (Road Side Unit) if signatures sent from vehicles are generated in a past time period.
Exp corr GS -TDL,A (λ) :
Return 1 if the following holds : Next, we give our anonymity definition which guarantees that no adversary who has tsk can distinguish whether two signatures are generated by the same signer or not, if the corresponding linkable signatures are not generated. In contrast to the BMW model, A is not allowed to obtain signing keys of challenge users (selfless anonymity). This is a reasonable setting since A can trivially break anonymity if A obtains such signing keys. For example, let A have sigk ID i 0 . Then, A can make a signature σ on T 0 using sigk ID i 0 (with arbitrary message M ), and can check whether Link(gpk, tpk, RL T 0 , (M 0 , σ * , T 0 ), (M, σ, T 0 )) = 1 or not, where σ * is the challenge signature. Instead, A is allowed to access the GSign oracle in our definition. Moreover, we consider backward unlinkability, where no adversary can break anonymity even after the challenge signers are revoked.
Definition IV.3 (Anonymity): For any PPT adversary A and a security parameter λ ∈ N, we define the experiment Exp
(gpk, tpk, tsk) 
, and return σ * . Without loss of generality, we set
If
, and return σ * 0 and σ * 1 . Moreover, we assume that t T 0 and t T 1 are valid tokens even though these are made by A, which means that the GVerify algorithm outputs 1 for all honestly generated signatures with t T 0 or t T 1 . 9 We say that GS -T DL is anonymous if the advantage Adv
GS,A (λ) = 1]| is negligible for any PPT adversary A. When T 0 = T 1 , our definition guarantees that two different signers are unlinkable even if they generate signatures at the same time period. We note that if A obtains two signatures even though T 0 = T 1 , then A can break anonymity by using the Link algorithm. Therefore, A is allowed to obtain one challenge signature σ * only. When T 0 = T 1 , our definition guarantees that a signer is still unlinkable if the signer respectively generates two signatures on different time periods. That is, when A obtains σ * 0 , which is generated by ID i 0 at a time T 0 , and σ * 1 , which is generated by ID i b at a time T 1 = T 0 , no A can distinguish whether two signatures are respectively made by the same user ID i 0 or different users ID i 0 and ID i 1 . In order to prevent a trivial linking attack, A is not allowed to obtain a signature for (ID i 0 , T 1 ) in this case.
We note that we do not have to consider the case 
C. Proposed GS-TDL Scheme
In this section, we give our GS-TDL scheme. Since we mainly pursue a light-weight realization of the system, here we do not employ structure preserving signatures (e.g., [49] ) and Groth-Sahai proofs [50] which are typically used for constructing group signature schemes secure in the standard model (e.g., [51] ). We employ the Fiat-Shamir transformation [52] which converts a three-move Σ protocol to non-interactive zeroknowledge (NIZK) proof as in group signature schemes secure in the random oracle model.
The Basic Idea: We mainly follow a common construction methodology of pairing-based group signature schemes [20] . A Boneh-Boyen signature [17] (or a BBS+ signature [53] ) is issued to a signer as a certificate (A = (
and is encrypted by a public key of the opener. According to the underlying curve selection, basically either the linear encryption scheme or the ElGamal encryption scheme is employed. Because we exclude the open functionality, we exchange the encryption scheme with a commitment scheme (C = Ah β in our scheme). A signer proves that a certificate is valid under the group public key by proving the knowledge of the discrete logarithms on the target group (i.e., G T ) of the pairing.
For the linking property, we apply the Franklin-Zhang technique [19] and the Chow technique [38] , where a group signature contains Belenkiy et al.'s verifiable random function (VRF) [54] . Concretely, the value τ = g 1 x + T is contained in a signature at a time T , where x is a (part of) signing key. If a signer computes two or more group signatures at a time T , then the value τ is the same, and can be linked without any cryptographic operation. τ itself can be seen as a random value (under the SDDHI assumption), so a signer is still anonymous unless the signer computes two or more group signatures at the same time.
For (verifier-local) revocation, we also apply τ such that τ is added in a revocation list. Note that the verification cost of VLR-type group signatures schemes [11] , [13] is O(|RL T |), especially, |RL T |-times pairing computations are required. To avoid such an inefficiency, we use the linkable part τ for revocation and this setting requires no cryptographic operation.
Moreover, we should consider signers that select T by themselves. To protect against the signers, we set tpk and tsk as a verification key and a signing key of a signature scheme respectively. For a time period T , a signature Σ ← Sign(tsk, W T ) is computed where W T = g T
, and the token t T is set as (T, W T , Σ).
Anyone can then check whether T is certified by the TGU that has tsk. Note that anyone can compute W T since T is just the time period and g 2 is a public element. Nevertheless, for the sake of efficiency, we include W T as a part of t T in our scheme because signers and verifiers do not have to compute W T .
Construction 1 (Proposed GS-TDL scheme):
be a bilinear group with prime order p, where g 1 = G 1 , g 2 = G 2 , and e :
2) GKeyGen(params): Choose γ τ 1 , c 1 , s x,1 , s δ,1 , s β ,1 ) . If either T = T 0 or T = T 1 , then output 0. Else if either GVerify(gpk, tpk, RL T 0 , M 0 , σ 0 ) = 0 or GVerify(gpk, tpk, RL T 0 , M 1 , σ 1 ) = 0, then output 0. Otherwise, output 1 if τ 0 = τ 1 , and 0 otherwise. Since τ just depends on T and x, and does not contain any randomness, we can directly use τ for revocation. Then we can achieve the (almost) constant verification cost by using hash tables which are made in the Revoke algorithm. [45] .
We give the security proofs of the following theorems in Appendix.
Theorem IV.1: The proposed GS-TDL scheme has anonymity in the random oracle model under the SDDHI assumption, where H is modeled as a random oracle.
Theorem IV.2: The proposed GS-TDL scheme has unforgeability in the random oracle model if the q-SDH assumption holds and (Gen, Sign, Verify) is EUF-CMA, where q is the number of signers and H is modeled as a random oracle.
Theorem IV.3: The proposed GS-TDL scheme has linking soundness.
V. ANONYMOUS TIME-DEPENDENT AUTHENTICATION AND ITS EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we construct an anonymous time-dependent authentication system via GS-TDL, and provide its experimental results.
A. Experimental Results of Our GS-TDL
Our implementation uses the RELIC library (ver.0.4.1) [15] for elliptic curve operations and the pairing operation, OpenSSL 11 (ver.1.0.2d) for standard signing and verifying, and GLib 12 (ver.2.47.1) for the hash table for (almost) constant-time searching. We note that we employ asymmetric pairing settings ((type III) Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves [55] ) with 254-bit order. We use the parameter of "Nogami-Aranha" given in an IETF Internet-Draft [56] . Table I shows the specifications of the machines we employed for experiments. Table II shows the running time of group operations.
Here, Mul(G 1 ,Type), Mul(G 2 ,Type), and Exp(G T ,Type) are scalar multiplication on G 1 and G 2 , and exponentiation on G T , respectively. If a base point is previously known, then Type is set as K, and U otherwise. We note that we always use Type U for operations on G T since the RELIC library does not support Type K operation on G T . Table III shows the running time of singing and verification algorithms of OpenSSL 3072-bit RSA, 3072-bit DSA, and prime 256v1 ECDSA on our environment. Optimization of GSign/GVerify: Originally, our GSign algorithm requires 2 Mul(G 1 ,K) + 4 Exp(G T ,U) + 2 Pairing (+Verify) and our GVerify algorithm requires 6 Exp(G T ,U) + 4 Pairing (+Verify) Here, we apply bilinearity of pairing in order to optimize the costs of algorithms by using Table II reduce the number of Exp(G T ,U) and pairings from the originals. In our environment, the running time of GSign (Optimized) is faster than that of GSign (Pairing-free). However, if the running time of 2 Exp(G T ,Type) is faster than that of 1 Pairing, then Pairing-free variant is more efficient.
Benchmarks of Each Algorithms:
We give our experimental results of our GS-TDL scheme in Table V . The total number of signers is 10,000,000, and the number of revoked signers is specified in parentheses () in the GVerify algorithm and the Revoke algorithm. We employ 3072-bit RSA for (TokenGen, Sign, Verify) which is used in our GS-TDL scheme since the verification cost (which is run by signers in the GSign algorithm) is faster than that of DSA and ECDSA in our environment.
We evaluate our results as follows.
1) (Almost) Constant Verification Cost:
First of all, we should highlight that cryptographic operations in the GVerify algorithm do not depend on the number of revoked vehicles (i.e., scalable) due to our time-dependent linkability, i.e., τ is deterministic, though we employ VLR-type revocation. In our implementation, a table preserves (ID, x) in the Join algorithm, and the table is regarded as grs. We set ID as a searching key (i.e., the table takes ID as input, and outputs the corresponding x). In the Revoke algorithm, an array of (ID, x, τ) is constructed, and each τ contained in the array is updated at T such that
)}. The corresponding hash table of τ is generated for (almost) constant-time searching. Therefore, the cost of the Revoke algorithm depends on the number of revoked vehicles (but we emphasize that this procedure is run by the key issuer, who has plenty of computational resource). In the GVerify algorithm, the verifier can easily check whether τ is contained in RL T or not by using the hash table without any cryptographic operation. 2) Practically Efficient Signing Cost: In some situation, such as a road-to-vehicle communication system introduced in the next subsection, a signer has a constrained computational power, and moreover the signer needs to generate signatures frequently. In our experimental result, the GSign algorithm can be run at 142.472 milliseconds even on Raspberry Pi, and it is comparable to RSA/DSA with similar security level, though our system additionally supports anonymity. If the signer has a standard computational power (as in x86_64 server), then the GSign algorithm can be run at 2.078 milliseconds. This result shows that our system is feasible enough in practice.
B. Network Simulation
For constructing an actual system, we need to find a suitable time period interval. If we set T as short as possible, then the anonymity level of our system comes closer to that of group signature schemes (i.e., signatures are always unlinkable). If we set T as long as possible, then the anonymity level of our system comes closer to that of usual signature schemes (i.e., signatures are always linkable). Because a suitable time period depends on applications, here we investigate the minimum time period interval in which the system works. For example, if T is too short, then RSUs may not be able to start verification of signatures since they need to obtain the revocation list at the beginning of the time period.
Moreover, we should consider a "blank" time period during which vehicles stop to generate signatures. This blank time is necessary to cut the linkage of location information which would be contained in messages. For example, suppose that a vehicle broadcasts a message and a corresponding signature periodically, e.g. in a second, and there is no such blank time. The last message generated in time period T and the first message generated by the next time period are then linkable although corresponding signatures are unlinkable, because locations indicated by these messages are too close to guess that these are generated by the same vehicle.
Estimating the Minimum Time Period Interval: First, we estimate the minimum time period interval, say T min seconds, during which the system works. Let N receive be the number of signatures that an RSU receives per second, and N verify be the number of signatures that an RSU can verify per second.
Let t RL be the time during which an RSU waits to receive the revocation list. During the current time period T , an RSU receives N receive · T signatures. On the other hand, the RSU can verify N verify (T − t RL + T blank ) signatures, where T blank is the blank time period. Recall that RSUs cannot start the verification procedure before receiving the revocation list. If the verification procedure is finished before the next time periods starts, then N receive · T ≤ N verify (T − t RL + T blank ) need to hold. Remark that the purpose of introducing T blank in our simulations is to cut the linkage of location information. Thus, the system should work even if T blank = 0. In this case, if N receive ≥ N verify then no RSU can complete the verification procedure. Thus, we assume that N verify > N receive here, and we can estimate T min as follows.
Although N verify and t RL can be estimated by Table V, for estimating N receive , it is necessary to simulate in a reasonable setting because it is very situation-dependent.
System Architecture: Here, we define four entities as follows: a vehicle V, the vehicle manufacturer VM, the Road Side Unit RSU, and the Token Generation Unit T GU. We can consider multiple RSU s but we assume only one T GU in this paper. We assume that params ← Setup(1 λ ) has been honestly run, and all entities share params. First, VM runs (gpk, gsk, grs, RL 0 ) ← GKeyGen(params) and T GU runs (tpk, tsk) ← TKeyGen(params). When a vehicle V is sold, VM runs sigk ID ← Join(gsk, grs, ID), and V preserves sigk ID . At a time period T , T GU runs t T ← TokenGen(tsk, T ) and broadcasts t T . Moreover, VM updates the revocation list, and sends RL T to all RSU. A vehicle V generates a group signature on local information M such that σ ← GSign(gpk, tpk, t T , sigk ID , M).
Simulation Setup: We consider the following cases based on the timing of generating signatures. 1) Method 1: A vehicle V generates σ every few seconds and broadcasts (M, σ, T ). Here, we assume that each vehicle moves at a speed of approximately 40 km/h in our simulation, and we set three seconds as the signature generation interval. Each vehicle then reports local information to RSU s at intervals of approximately three meters. It seems reasonable to trace travel routes.
2) Method 2: A vehicle V generates σ and sends (M, σ, T )
to an RSU when V enters a certain range of the RSU. In our simulation, the range is set as 239 m. 13 In Method 1, vehicles must generate and broadcast signatures even no RSU exists around them. Thus, vehicles send more signatures than Method 2. Moreover, RSU s also receive many signatures than those of Method 2. At the expense of these costs, Method 1 seems better to collect linkable information. We will discuss which method is better from the simulation results, and will conclude that Method 1 seems better in a rural area, and Method 2 seems better in an urban area.
We set T as 600 seconds and T blank as 600 seconds. After the blank time period T blank , the next time period will start, and vehicles generate signatures (according to either Method 1 or 2). Since vehicles send signatures to RSU s via wireless communications, RSU s may not be able to receive signatures owing to the wireless communication environments. Thus, we need to consider the visibility of the location that relates the path loss of the communication. In radio wave propagation analysis, there are two path loss models for line-of-sight (LoS) and non-lineof-sight (NLoS) environments. In an urban area (which has low visibility), the LoS model is employed. In a rural area (which has high visibility), the NLoS model is employed. We select two places with different levels of visibility. One is Ginza area, which has low visibility owing to tall buildings, and the LoS Moreover, we set 2,000 vehicles and 1,000 vehicles in these areas, respectively. As approximately 200,000 vehicles are discarded per year in Japan 14 , we set the number of revoked vehicles as 4,000,000 which covers the number of discarded vehicles in a period of 20 years. Moreover, we employ IEEE 802.11p as the communication protocol from a vehicle V to an RSU.
The detailed simulation flow is given as follows: 1) At the beginning of time period T , VM generates the current revocation list, and each RSU receives it. In the simulation, each RSU waits t RL seconds which are determined by the size of the revocation list and Table V . We set t RL = 278.2 seconds, and assume that there is a channel to send the revocation list to each RSU, and we ignore the sending time. 2) Immediately after T starts, each vehicle V generates a group signature and send it to RSU s (according to either Method 1 or 2). We assume that each vehicle can obtain a time token immediately, and assume that this time can be ignored. In the simulation, each vehicle V Fig. 3 . In these figures, red triangles indicate RSU s and each dot indicates a group signature generated by a vehicle. We pick up the RSU s that preserve the highest number of stacked signatures in our simulations, and display the location of these RSU s by the red circle. We draw a blue line as the route through which the vehicle travelled during the simulation. We track the same vehicle in Ginza area and Koganei area. waits 142.472 milliseconds (see Table V ) for generating a group signature. If RSU s wait to receive the revocation list sent from VM, then RSU s preserve group signatures sent from V s, and verify them after receiving the list. In the simulation, each RSU waits 2.90 milliseconds (see Table V ) for a group signature verification. Somewhat surprisingly, the busiest RSU which accumulates 9,371 signatures, appears in Koganei area, though it is a relatively rural area compared to Ginza area. In the case of Koganei with Method 1, the RSU is located in a crossroad (we display the location of the RSU by the red circle in Fig. 3(c) , and there is a traffic light. Since vehicles broadcast signatures when they pause at a light, the RSU receives more signatures than the others. We show the number of stacked signatures for the RSU in Fig. 2 . As the figure shows, the number of stacked signatures is immediately reduced after the RSU s start to verify the signatures.
In our simulations, an RSU receives no more than 10,000 signatures per 300 seconds. Thus, we roughly estimate and set N receive as 40. From our benchmarks (Table V) , each RSU can complete the verification of a signature within 2.9 milliseconds. Thus, each RSU can verify approximately 344 signatures per second, so we set N verify = 344. Moreover, from a reasonable setting and our benchmarks (Table V) , we set t RL = 278.2 seconds. From these values, we can estimate T min = 314.8 seconds.
Visualization of our simulation: Finally, we display our simulation results over maps in Figs. 3(a)-(d) . We use OpenStreetMap. 15 Each dot indicates a group signature generated by a vehicle. Red triangles indicate RSU s. We display the location of the RSU s picked up in Table VII by the red circles. In our simulation (60 minutes), a vehicle generates signatures for 600 seconds which are colored by magenta. After the first (resp. second) blank time (600 seconds), the vehicle again generates signatures for 600 seconds which are colored by black (resp. brown). Recall that signatures generated in the same time period are linkable (these colors are the same), and signatures generated at different time periods are unlinkable (these colors are different). For the sake of clarity, we draw a blue line as the route through which the vehicle travelled during the simulation. We track the same vehicle in Ginza area and Koganei area.
Finally, we discuss which method is better from the simulation results. In Ginza area (an urban area), each RSU is frequently located as there are many crossroads. Thus, both methods work well for correcting linkable information. As the number of stacked signatures in Method 2 is smaller than that of Method 1, Method 2 seems to work better in an urban area. In 15 OpenStreetMap: https://www.openstreetmap.org/ Koganei area (a rural area), each RSU is infrequently located. Thus, Method 1 Fig. 3(c) performs superior to Method 2 ( Fig. 6) for correcting linkable information because we can easily follow the track of the route that a vehicle passes through in 600 seconds. Thus, Method 1 has better performance in rural areas.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a road-to-vehicle communication system via group signatures with time-token dependent linking (GS-TDL), and our network simulation demonstrates that our algorithm fits well for road-to-vehicle communication systems. Our system not only has good performance but also supports the revocation property which is essential in real systems. It is particularly worth noting that no vehicle is involved in the revocation procedure and the signing/verification costs do not depend on the number of revoked vehicles.
We set RSUs in appropriate locations, e.g., at traffic lights of crossroads, in the middle of a long road, etc. However, we may consider alternative installation locations for RSUs that may better reflect real environments. We leave this as a future work to follow up this paper.
APPENDIX SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR GS-TDL
Proof of Theorem IV.1 Proof: We define the following two games: Game 0 is the same as Exp * → Z p is a hash function modeled as a random oracle. B also runs (vk, sigk) ← Gen(1 λ ), and sets tpk := vk and tsk := sigk. B sends gpk, tpk, and tsk to A.
In the i-th AddU query (with input ID), where First Case: We construct an algorithm B that breaks EUF-CMA security of the underlying signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Verify). The challenger of the signature scheme runs (vk, sigk) ← Gen(1 λ ), and sends vk to B. B sets tpk := vk, runs params ← Setup(1 λ ) and (gpk, gsk) ← GKeyGen(params), and sends (gpk, tpk) to A. For a TokenGen query T , B computes W T = g T 2 , sends W T to the challenger as a signing query, and obtains Σ. B sets t T = (T, W T , Σ), and sends t T to A. Since B has gsk, B can respond all AddU, GSign, and USK queries. We remark that A does not access the TSK oracle. Finally, A outputs (T, M, σ). Since σ is a valid group signature, there exist (Σ, W T ) such that W T is used in the verification algorithm, and Σ is a valid signature under vk. = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g 1 , g 2 ), and gpk = (params, h, W, e(g 1 , g 2 ), e(h, W ), e(h, g 2 ), H), and gives (gpk, tpk) to A.
For an AddU query, B chooses unselected x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x q } and sets the corresponding (x, y, A) as the signing key. Since B has tsk, B can respond TokenGen and TSK queries. Moreover, B can respond GSign and Revoke queries since B has all signing keys (x i , y i , A i ) for each i ∈ [1, q] . and T = T 0 = T 1 holds. Then, x 0 = x 1 holds. Since x 0 and x 1 are randomly chosen, this equation holds with probability at most 1/p. This concludes the proof.
